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THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AUTHORITY OF THE COMPETITION BOARD SET OUT UNDER ARTICLE 15 OF LAW NR. 4054 ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AUTHORITY OF THE COMPETITION BOARD SET OUT UNDER ARTICLE 15 OF LAW NR. 4054 ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

1. Introduction

Article 15, titled “On-Site Inspection”, of Law Nr. 4054 on the Protection of Competition grants the Competition Board the authority to conduct on-site inspections at the premises of undertakings and associations of undertakings where it deems necessary for the fulfilment of the duties entrusted to the same under the Law. Pursuant to this provision, the Board is authorized to examine the books and documents of undertakings or associations of undertakings, as well as any data and documents kept in physical or electronic form and within information systems, and to take their copies and physical samples, and to request written or oral explanations on specific matters, and to conduct on-site inspections of the assets of undertakings. The inspections are carried out by experts serving within the Competition Authority, who act upon presentation of their authorization documents indicating the subject matter and purpose of the inspection, as well as the administrative fines that may be imposed in case any false or misleading information is provided.

Undertakings, for their part, are obliged to provide copies of the requested information and documents. In cases where the on-site inspection is actually obstructed or where there is a likelihood that it might be obstructed, the Law provides that the inspection shall be carried out upon a decision of the judge of criminal court of peace.

Accordingly, the Law, as a rule, grants the Board the authority to conduct on-site inspections of the assets of undertakings by its own decision, without the need for any prior judicial authorization or approval. In addition, the Board is also vested with the power to impose administrative fines in cases where the inspection is hindered or obstructed.

On the other hand, Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the inviolability of domicile and stipulates that, except for reasons such as national security, public order, the prevention of crime, the protection of public health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, no dwelling may be entered, searched, or have its property seized without a duly issued judicial warrant. In cases where delay would be prejudicial, such measures may be carried out upon the written order of the competent authority; however, this order must be submitted for the approval of a judge within twenty-four hours, and the judge must render a decision within forty-eight hours; otherwise, the seizure shall automatically become null and void.

Although the provision in question bears the heading “inviolability of domicile,” when assessed within the framework of the regime of fundamental rights and freedoms, it is accepted that this safeguard is not limited solely to private residences, and that workplaces may also benefit from constitutional protection within the scope of inviolability. The on-site inspection authority, which had previously been brought before the Constitutional Court under the “Ford Otosan” decision, has this time been referred to the Court through objections raised by the 13th Chamber of the Council of State and the 11th Administrative Court of Ankara in actions brought against the administrative fines imposed by the Board.

2. Analysis of the Decision

Under its decision, dated November 6, 2025 and bearing the Basis number 2023/174 and the Decision number 2025/224, and pursuant to the provision, published in the Official Journal on February 17, 2026, the Constitutional Court concluded, by a majority vote, that the on-site inspection authority, as set out under Article 15 of Law Nr. 4054 on the Protection of Competition, is not contrary to the Constitution. As noted above, the decision is significant in that it follows the jurisprudence established by the Constitutional Court in 2023, in response to an individual application by Ford Otomotiv Sanayi A.Ş.—commonly referred to in practice as the “Ford Otosan decision”—and considers the same statutory provision this time within the scope of a concrete judicial review. Under the decision on the aforementioned individual application, the Court had noted that the manner in which on-site inspections are carried out could give rise to issues with respect to the right to inviolability of domicile, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and that inspections conducted without a judicial warrant might not be consistent with constitutional safeguards. The courts that lodged the objections were the 13th Chamber of the Council of State and the 11th Administrative Court of Ankara. In these applications, the constitutional compliance of two separate provisions, set out under Article 15 of Law Nr. 4054 on the Protection of Competition, was contested. The first of these is the first paragraph granting the Competition Board the authority to conduct on-site inspections at the premises of undertakings and associations of undertakings “where it deems necessary.” The second is the third paragraph providing that, in the event that the inspection is obstructed or there is a likelihood of obstruction, the on-site inspection may be conducted upon a decision of the judge of criminal court of peace. The Court assessed these two provisions separately, conducting a procedural review with respect to the third paragraph and a substantive review with respect to the first paragraph.

The Constitutional Court determined that the cases subject to the objections did not arise from actions based on a judicial decision under the third paragraph of Article 15, but rather from administrative fines imposed under Article 16. Accordingly, it concluded that the third paragraph was not applicable in the concrete disputes, and the applications were dismissed on procedural grounds for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court examined the first paragraph within the framework of the principle of the rule of law, as set out under Article 2 of the Constitution, and the duties assigned to the State under Article 167 to protect competition and ensure the orderly functioning of markets. The decision notes that the on-site inspection authority serves the purpose of establishing a competitive order entrusted to the State under Article 167 of the Constitution. With regard to the principle of the rule of law, the decision emphasizes that legal norms must be clear and foreseeable, noting that the phrase “where it deems necessary” does not grant the Board unlimited or arbitrary authority; rather, its powers are limited to the scope of duties set out under the Law and to the purpose of detecting competition infringements. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that on-site inspections are carried out by authorized experts upon presentation of their authorization documents, and that any physical intervention or use of force is only permissible pursuant to a decision of the judge of criminal court of peace. Within this framework, the Court emphasized that the Authority does not possess inherent powers to use force. The Court further noted that competition infringements may arise in highly diverse and unpredictable ways, and therefore it is not possible for the legislature to set out every eventuality in detail. Whether an on-site inspection is to be conducted must be determined based on the circumstances of the specific case, and this is regarded as an extension of the discretion granted to the legislative body.

In conclusion, the Constitutional Court held that the phrase contained in the first paragraph of Article 15 is not ambiguous and does not violate the principle of the rule of law, ruling that the provision is in compliance with Articles 2 and 167 of the Constitution.

Another notable aspect of the decision is that the Court did not carry out its review within the framework of the regime of limitations for fundamental rights and freedoms, set out under Article 13 of the Constitution, nor within the context of the right to inviolability of domicile, guaranteed under Article 21. In addition, there was no explicit reference to the previous individual application decision.

3. Dissenting Opinions

As noted above, the decision was adopted by a majority vote. The dissenting opinions primarily refer to the Ford Otosan decision and its content, asserting that the contested provision should be examined within the framework of the right to inviolability of domicile, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. According to the dissenting opinions, the Board-authorized officials are granted the authority to enter portions of workplaces that have the character of a dwelling, without a judicial warrant, and to examine and take samples of records and data located there. However, this authority is not limited solely to situations where delay would be prejudicial; rather, it is structured as a general and continuous power. The judicial decision comes into play only if the parties concerned do not consent to the inspection, meaning that the constitutional safeguard is made conditional on an exceptional circumstance. In addition, it is emphasized that there is no clearly provided mechanism for judicial review in constitutional terms following the procedure. For these reasons, the dissenting opinions concluded that the provision is inconsistent with the guarantees, set out under Articles 13 and 21 of the Constitution, and it should be annulled.

In another dissenting opinion, it was stated that the phrase “where it deems necessary” leaves the authority to interfere with fundamental rights entirely to the discretion of the authority. The opinion notes that this phrase does not define situations where delay would be prejudicial, lacks objective criteria, and does not clearly specify in which cases a judicial award must be sought. This ambiguity was argued to be inconsistent with the principles of legality, clarity, and prevention of arbitrariness, set out under Articles 2 and 13 of the Constitution.

Furthermore, the dissenting opinions note that the provision allowing recourse to the judge of criminal court of peace in cases where the on-site inspection is obstructed or there is a likelihood of obstruction is applicable in concrete disputes and forms an integral part of the regime governing the inviolability of domicile. According to the dissenting opinions, both the phrase “where it deems necessary” and the provision regarding judicial award do not limit the interference solely to situations where delay would be prejudicial, and they make judicial review conditional upon an exceptional circumstance.

In this respect, the dissenting opinions argued that the provision does not adequately safeguard the inviolability of domicile, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. They further concluded that the provisions in question are also inconsistent with Articles 13 and 21 of the Constitution in terms of the principles of legality and proportionality.

The dissenting opinion argued that the majority’s departure from this jurisprudence constitutes a regression in terms of the protection of fundamental rights and creates a contradiction with the Court’s previous decisions. Consequently, it was assessed that the majority’s approach is inconsistent both with the principle of reasoned decisions and with the Constitution’s function of safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms.

4. Conclusion

In my view, the observations set out in the dissenting opinions provide a strong and coherent framework with respect to constitutional safeguards. Indeed, the on-site inspection authority granted to the authority directly touches upon the domain of fundamental rights by its very nature. A power of such breadth and involving practical intervention cannot be considered in isolation from constitutional rights and freedoms. In particular, considering that workplaces are also among the spaces protected under Article 21 of the Constitution, evaluating the on-site inspection authority independently of the guarantee of inviolability of domicile is not consistent with the constitutional system. The scope of the intervention, the procedure for its implementation, and the stage at which judicial review comes into play are directly related to the essence of this constitutional safeguard. Furthermore, taking into account the Constitutional Court’s assessment regarding the inviolability of domicile under the Ford Otosan decision, adopting a completely independent approach from this jurisprudence in the context of concrete judicial review raises questions in terms of legal predictability and consistency of case law. While methodological differences are possible in constitutional review, examining a power that directly affects fundamental rights in isolation from previous jurisprudence does not appear convincing with regard to the integrity of the constitutional safeguard system.

Within this framework, it can be argued that the dissenting opinions—asserting that the provision concerning on-site inspection authority should be assessed in light of the principles of the rule of law, legality, and proportionality, as well as the guarantee of inviolability of domicile—rest on a stronger foundation in terms of the protection of constitutional rights. The interpretation of administrative powers that have the potential to interfere with fundamental rights independently of constitutional safeguards and established jurisprudence is not consistent with a rights-centered understanding of the Constitution.

Att. Melda İz

References:

1.  The Decision, dated 06/11/2025 and bearing the Basis number 2023/174 and the Decision number 2025/224, of the Constitutional Court https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2026/02/20260217-7.pdf

2.  Constitutional Court Application, dated 23/3/2023, of Ford Otomotiv Sanayi Anonim Şirketi (App. Nr: 2019/40991)

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