1. Introduction
The year 2026, much like the
preceding years, witnessed significant developments relating to the Competition
Board’s investigations, formal investigations, and commitment procedures across
a wide range of sectors. The Board’s decisions primarily focused on companies'
market conduct, allegations of abuse of dominant position, anti-competitive
agreements and practices, and the effective use of the commitment mechanism.
The decisions adopted during this period demonstrate that the Competition Board
has continued to address competition concerns not only through findings of
infringement and the imposition of administrative monetary fines, but also by
making effective use of instruments such as interim measures, settlement
procedures, and commitments. Particular attention was paid to companies’
positions in the markets in which they operate, their use of data, their
commercial strategies, and the potential transfer or leveraging of their market
power into adjacent markets. The following section examines a selection of
Competition Board decisions announced in 2026 that are of particular
significance for the enforcement and development of Turkish competition law.
2. Conclusion of the
Investigation Against Sahibinden Through Commitments [1]
The Competition Board decided,
by its decision dated 16.01.2025, to initiate a formal investigation to
determine whether Sahibinden Bilgi Teknolojileri Pazarlama ve Ticaret AŞ had
infringed Article 6 of Law Nr. 4054 on the Protection of Competition. The
investigation concerned the relationship between Sahibinden’s vehicle listing
services and its online second-hand vehicle buying and selling services. In the
course of its investigation, the Board examined whether Sahibinden had used the
user data obtained through its online platform services provided to corporate
and individual customers for vehicle sales activities in the market for online
second-hand vehicle buying and selling services. In addition, Sahibinden’s
substantial advertising expenditures relating to its Otobid service, together
with the advantages arising from its existing market power, were also assessed
under Article 6 of Law Nr. 4054.
This decision demonstrates that
the Competition Board continues to make effective use of the commitment
mechanism as a tool for addressing allegations of abuse of dominant position.
It also highlights that the use by companies of their commercial advantages,
user data, or existing market power in other areas of activity may be subject
to close scrutiny under competition law. During the investigation, the Board
considered Sahibinden's integration of the user data obtained through its
vehicle listing services with its other services to constitute a significant
competition law concern. In this context, the Board decided to impose an
interim measure pursuant to Article 9(4) of Law Nr. 4054 in order to prevent
irreparable harm pending the adoption of a final decision.
While the investigation was
ongoing, Sahibinden requested to submit commitments to address the Competition
Board's competition concerns. Following discussions between the parties, the
final commitment submitted by Sahibinden was assessed by the Board, which
concluded that the proposed commitments were capable of eliminating the
competition concerns that had given rise to the investigation. Under those
commitments, Sahibinden undertook not to display or promote the Otobid service
on its website or mobile application, not to direct users to the Otobid service
during the listing process, not to use non-public data obtained through its
vehicle listing activities for the purposes of the Otobid service, and to
implement the necessary organizational, operational, administrative, and
technical measures to ensure compliance with those commitments. In addition,
Sahibinden committed that, once a specified threshold had been exceeded, the
revenue generated from the Otobid service would be sufficient to cover the
variable costs and advertising expenditures incurred in providing that service.
The Board found that the commitments offered were proportionate to the
competition concerns, suitable for eliminating those concerns, capable of being
implemented within a short period, and capable of being effectively monitored.
Accordingly, by its decision dated 25.12.2025, the Board decided to conclude
the investigation through commitments pursuant to Article 43 of Law Nr. 4054.
This decision demonstrates that,
when assessing allegations of abuse of dominant position, the Competition Board
regards the commitment mechanism not merely as a means of promoting procedural
economy, but also as a functional instrument for ensuring the prompt and
effective resolution of competition concerns in the market. Although the Board
concluded the investigation without making a determination of infringement, it
attached particular importance to ensuring that the commitments offered by the
company were capable of addressing the competition concerns and were both
implementable and capable of effective monitoring.
The decision further
demonstrates that, particularly in the case of companies operating multi-sided
platforms, data sets, user bases, brand recognition, and commercial reach may
each constitute independent subjects of scrutiny under competition law. In this
regard, although the use of commercial advantages or user data acquired in one
market in a neighboring or related market is not, in itself, considered
unlawful, the Board closely examines whether such conduct confers a competitive
advantage that is not based on competition on the merits and whether it impedes
the activities of competing companies.
In this respect, the decision
reflects the Competition Board's approach of recognizing that market power may
arise not only through pricing practices or exclusivity arrangements, but also
through factors such as the use of data, steering mechanisms, platform
visibility, and the integration of different services. Accordingly, when transferring
data, user traffic, or commercial advantages across different areas of
activity, companies should also assess whether such practices produce exclusionary
effects in the relevant markets. Ultimately, the decision demonstrates that the
commitment mechanism has become an increasingly prominent solution of resolving
allegations of abuse of dominant position. At the same time, it confirms that
the Board accepts this mechanism only where competition concerns can be
addressed through commitments that are concrete, measurable, and capable of
being implemented within a short period. The decision also indicates that
companies should specifically consider, as part of their competition law
compliance processes, practices such as leveraging existing market power into
other areas of activity, using user data across different services, and
extending platform-related advantages to new business activities.
3. Initiation of a Formal
Investigation Against Meta and the Interim Measure Decision [2]
One of the Competition Board's
notable decisions in 2026 was its decision to initiate a formal investigation
into the Meta economic entity, comprising Meta Platforms, Inc., Meta Platforms
Ireland Limited, WhatsApp LLC, and Meta Platforms İstanbul Bilişim Hizmetleri
Limited Şirketi. Following its preliminary inquiry, the Board decided, by its
decision dated 14.05.2026, to initiate a formal investigation to determine
whether the Meta economic entity had infringed Article 6 of Law Nr. 4054 on the
Protection of Competition.
The investigation focuses on
Meta's integration of its "Meta AI" artificial intelligence service
into WhatsApp and on whether this integration prevents any third-party
artificial intelligence providers from offering their services through WhatsApp
. In this context, the Board is examining whether Meta has used its position in
relation to WhatsApp to confer an advantage on its own artificial intelligence
service and whether such conduct has made market access more difficult for
third-party providers of general-purpose generative AI chatbots. During the
preliminary inquiry, the Board considered that Meta's conduct preventing
third-party providers of general-purpose generative AI chatbots or assistants
from offering AI services as the primary service through WhatsApp constituted
serious indications of an infringement of Article 6 of Law Nr. 4054.
Accordingly, the Board decided not only to initiate a formal investigation but
also to impose an interim measure in order to prevent irreparable harm pending
the adoption of a final decision. In this regard, the Board required Meta to
establish the conditions necessary to enable third-party providers of
general-purpose generative AI chatbots to offer AI services as the primary
service through WhatsApp. The Board further emphasized that those conditions
must not make the provision of such services factually or economically more
difficult.
Furthermore, it was stated that
if Meta fails to comply with the obligations imposed within one month following
the service of the reasoned interim measure decision, an administrative
monetary fine may be imposed pursuant to Article 17 of Law Nr. 4054.
The Meta decision demonstrates
that the Competition Board closely scrutinizes the competitive effects of
technology companies expanding their existing strong platforms into new service
areas. The decision also indicates that, as artificial intelligence services
become increasingly important within digital ecosystems, issues relating to
integration, access restrictions, and self-preferencing in this field are
likely to receive greater attention from a competition law perspective.
4. Spotify Decisions:
Obstruction of an On-Site Inspection and the Imposition of Daily Administrative
Monetary Fines [3], [4]
The Competition Board’s
decisions dated 17.07.2025 and numbered 25-26/634-392, and dated 28.08.2025 and
numbered 25-32/759-450, concerning the economic entity comprising Spotify
Dijital Yayıncılık Hizmetleri AŞ, Spotify Yönetim Destek Hizmetleri AŞ, and
Spotify AB, are significant regarding the effective exercise of the Competition
Board’s on-site inspection powers under Law Nr. 4054 on the Protection of
Competition and the sanctions applicable where such powers are obstructed. This
issue is currently the subject of ongoing discussions, particularly in relation
to its constitutionality.
The process underlying these
decisions began with the Competition Board’s decision dated 26.06.2025 to
initiate a preliminary inquiry into Spotify. The preliminary inquiry was based
on allegations that Spotify had discriminated among artists and content
creators on its platform, particularly regarding visibility, hindered the
activities of competing companies operating in the online music streaming
services market, and/or implemented anti-competitive strategies affecting the
distribution of royalty payments. As part of the preliminary inquiry, Turkish
Competition Authority officials sought to conduct an on-site inspection on 02.07.2025
at the address notified as Spotify’s headquarters in Türkiye. However, the
Board concluded that, during the inspection process, it encountered various
acts on the part of the company that resulted in the obstruction of the on-site
inspection. Accordingly, in its decision dated 17.07.2025, the Board found that
the Spotify economic entity had obstructed the on-site inspection and imposed
an administrative monetary fine amounting to five per thousand of the company's
gross annual revenue for 2024 pursuant to Article 16(1)(d) of Law Nr. 4054.
One of the noteworthy aspects of
the decision is that the Board did not merely conclude that the on-site
inspection had been obstructed; it also made clear that the company was
required to invite Competition Authority officials to enable the inspection to
be carried out subsequently. In this regard, the Board stated that failure by
the company to ensure the necessary conditions for the conduct of the on-site
inspection may result in the imposition of a daily administrative monetary fine
pursuant to Article 17 of Law Nr. 4054.
Indeed, the second decision,
dated 28.08.2025 and numbered 25-32/759-450, concerns the daily administrative
monetary fine imposed for the period until this continuing obligation was
fulfilled. The Board found that Spotify’s letter inviting Competition Authority
officials to conduct the on-site inspection was received by the Authority on 15.08.2025
and decided to impose a daily administrative monetary fine for the period up to
that date pursuant to Article 17(1)(b) of Law Nr. 4054. Accordingly, a total
administrative monetary fine of TRY 27,630,373.57 was imposed on Spotify.
Taken together, these two
decisions demonstrate that the Competition Board does not regard its on-site
inspection powers as being limited to physical access to business premises and
the collection of documents. Rather, it considers all obligations relating to
access and cooperation that are necessary to ensure that an on-site inspection
is carried out promptly and effectively, in a manner consistent with its
purpose, to fall within the scope of those powers. These decisions are of
particular significance for companies with a limited personnel or operational
presence in Türkiye that nevertheless conduct their activities in the Turkish
market through teams based abroad.
The Board's approach indicates
that the complexity of a company's organizational structure, the fact that
relevant information and documents are accessible only through employees or
systems based abroad, or the existence of limited human resources within its
Turkish company does not relieve companies of their obligation to comply with
an on-site inspection. Rather, companies operating in the Turkish market are
expected to establish, in advance, internal organizational and compliance
mechanisms that enable the Competition Authority to obtain access, within a
reasonable time, to the relevant personnel, documents, data, and systems during
an on-site inspection.
In this respect, the Spotify
decisions demonstrate that the concepts of obstructing or hindering an on-site
inspection are interpreted broadly. Conduct such as remaining passive during
the inspection, failing to provide access to the necessary personnel and
systems, or delays in identifying the relevant decision-making processes or the
relevant employees may, depending on the circumstances of the particular case,
be regarded as obstructing or hindering an on-site inspection.
In conclusion, the Spotify
decisions demonstrate that the Competition Board continues to make effective
use of its powers to request information and conduct on-site inspections under
Articles 14 and 15 of Law Nr. 4054, while also imposing the administrative
monetary fines provided for under Articles 16 and 17 of the Law in cases where
the exercise of those powers is obstructed or hindered. The decisions are
significant in demonstrating that competition law compliance programs should
not be limited to compliance with the substantive rules of competition law but
should also include clear and practical procedures governing on-site
inspections.
Att. Melda İz
References:
3.https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Karar?kararId=ab6a5ce2-e5bd-446b-a24f-21e2bab0c09b
4.https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Karar?kararId=ba2d32fb-d4cc-43e4-8980-2a8354380b71
