Özgün Law Firm

Özgün Law Firm

CAN CREDIT SUISSE AT1 BONDHOLDERS RESORT TO INVESTMENT ARBITRATION FOR THEIR LOSSES?

CAN CREDIT SUISSE AT1 BONDHOLDERS RESORT TO INVESTMENT ARBITRATION FOR THEIR LOSSES?

1. INTRODUCTION

In March 2023, after the Swiss bank Credit Suisse published its financial report for 2022 and announced a loss of 7.3 billion Swiss francs and Saudi National Bank, which bought 9.9% of the bank's shares for 1.4 billion Swiss francs in 2022, announced that it would not make new investments in the bank, Credit Suisse's shares fell 40% in a week and the bank entered an economic crisis. [1]

In the first stage of the crisis, it was announced that the bank would get a loan of 54 billion dollars from the Swiss Central Bank. During this process, a part of the bank's shareholders filed a lawsuit against the bank and bank officials, claiming that they had deceived the shareholders by withholding information about Credit Suisse's financial situation revealed by internal audits. [2]

Subsequently, UBS, which is the largest bank in Switzerland, announced that Credit Suisse was planning to acquire the bank in order to exit the crisis and that the negotiations were being conducted by the Swiss Ministry of Finance, the Swiss Financial Markets Regulatory Authority (FINMA) and the Swiss Central Bank and that the sale process would be realized with the support of these institutions. Within the agreement, Credit Suisse shareholders will receive 1 UBS share for every 22.48 shares in Credit Suisse, making the value of each share in Credit Suisse CHF 0.76 and the total sale price of CHF 3 billion. [3]

FINMA announced that the merger of Credit Suisse with UBS will be financially supported by the government, which will write off Credit Suisse's AT1 bond debts by reducing the value of Credit Suisse's AT1 bonds ("additional tier 1 bonds") with a nominal value of approximately CHF 16 billion to zero, thus increasing the bank's tier 1 capital. [4]

After the sale of the bank for CHF 3 billion, it was understood that the holders of AT1 bonds would not receive anything under the agreement, unlike the shareholders. AT1 bonds were written down, whereas shareholders would obtain a certain amount from the sales prince as a proportion of their shares. As a result, AT1 bond holders took legal action. [5]

In this article, firstly, we will briefly explain the scope, development, and function of AT1 bonds. Then, we will try to explain how the write-off of AT1 bonds can be the subject of a dispute by looking at the public debates that have taken place so far. In the last section, we will evaluate whether the holders of AT1 bonds, whose investments have lost significant value, can subject their losses to investment arbitration.

2. WHAT ARE AT1 BONDS (COCO BONDS OR CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE BONDS)?

AT1 capital instruments, referred to as CoCo bonds ("contingent convertible bonds"), are investment instruments introduced in the Europe market after the global financial crisis in 2008. In the ordinary course of business, investors holding CoCo bonds are paid coupons just like any other bondholder. However, in case of financial distress, to ease the bank's balance sheets, the coupon payments on these debt securities can be cancelled, converted into shares or written off from the balance sheet by writing off losses to investors. [6]

The aim of AT1 bonds is to create an extra buffer against shocks in the event of bank failure, increase the resilience of the banking system and reduce the threat of systemic risk. [7] Thus, in the event of a bank failure, the cost of bankruptcy would be borne primarily by the investors holding these bonds, rather than the taxpayers. [8]Therefore, AT1 or CoCo bonds are considered as risk transfer instruments to mitigate the devastating effects of banking crises. [9]

AT1 bonds are the riskiest bonds offered by banks and are issued with the promise of high yields. The risk taken in exchange for this high yield is the assumption of losses in the event of bank failure. [10] The size of the AT1 bond market in Europe is approximately €250 billion. [11]

3. CAN CREDIT SUISSE BE SUED FOR WRITTEN OFF AT1 BONDS?

As explained above, AT1 bonds are designed as risky investment instruments and it is known that in the event of a crisis, they may be written off from the balance sheet and the bondholders will bear the related losses.

Then why did the authorization of FINMA to write off AT1 bond debts as part of the merger between UBS and Credit Suisse [12] provoke a backlash and lead AT1 bondholders to explore their legal remedies?

The main argument here is that the hierarchy of loss-sharing has been broken down. [13] It is argued that the hierarchy between shares and AT1 securities is violated when the value of the shares is maintained at 0.76 Swiss francs as a result of the allocation of the consideration from the sale of Credit Suisse to the shareholders, while the AT1 bondholders lost their investment completely by reducing the value of their securities amounting to 16 billion Swiss francs to zero. This reduction happened despite that it is accepted that the creditor of debt securities (bonds or bills) will normally take precedence over shareholders in the priority of collection. [14] After the 2008 crisis, within the framework of international banking principles and rules developed after the crisis, the fact that AT1 bondholders did not receive any payment on the grounds that there was a precedent based on the superiority of AT1 bonds over shares was criticized and characterized as a punishment of investors. [15] Within this framework, the holders of AT1 bonds started to investigate their legal remedies. [16]

In the face of these allegations, FINMA's defense was that there was a contractual basis for the write-off of the AT1 capital instruments issued by Credit Suisse and that the contractual relationship permitted the write-off, especially in cases of extraordinary financial support by the state. Since it was agreed by the Swiss government to grant a liquidity support loan to Credit Suisse on March 19, 2023, these contractual conditions regarding the bank's AT1 capital instruments were satisfied. [17] According to FINMA, based on the fulfilment of these conditions, the decision to write down the AT1 bonds was lawful.

Previously, AT1 bonds were written off in Spain in 2017 when Santander Bank acquired Banco Popular for €1. Banco Popular was on the verge of bankruptcy back then, and the rescue operation of this bank and the write-off of AT1 bonds were challenged in court. [18] However, the main difference between the Banco Popular and Credit Suisse bailouts is that in the former, shareholders and AT1 bondholders were both losers, whereas in the latter, AT1 bondholders were the sole losers.

4. CAN AT1 BONDHOLDERS RESORT TO INVESTMENT ARBITRATION?

In exploring the legal remedies available to holders of AT1 bonds, we look at (i.) against whom and (ii.) before which jurisdictions they may bring claims. Public discussions suggest that these claims could be brought against Credit Suisse, UBS, FINMA and/or the Swiss government. It is also seen that these options are generally discussed within the scope of application to national courts. [19]

Another option that is not discussed as much as these options is international investment arbitration. It would be possible for AT1 bondholders who are not Swiss citizens to resort to international arbitration against the Swiss state. This is an alternative to national courts, by which natural or legal persons who are not Swiss nationals but are foreign investors would be the applicants. Foreign investors will apply to international investment arbitration based on the investment treaty concluded between the Swiss state and the states of which they are a citizen.

Agreements on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments (AMPPI) are international agreements concluded between states for the mutual promotion and protection of investments made by natural or legal persons of one contracting state in the territory of the other contracting state.

The concept of investment is defined in these agreements as any asset owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the investor. In this context, shares, bonds, investment income, monetary receivables, other financial rights that may be derived from the investment, movable and immovable property, real rights such as mortgages, liens, pledges, industrial and intellectual property rights such as copyrights, patents, licenses, industrial designs, technical processes, as well as, but not limited to, trademarks, know-how and other similar rights with material value may be considered as investments. Although the concept of investment is broadly defined in this way, in some bilateral investment treaties, this scope may be narrowed, and a more limited number of activities may be considered investments under the treaty. [19]

Turkey has bilateral investment treaties in force with a total of 85 countries. [20]

In these agreements, issues such as "determining the limits of the treatment to be applied to the investor by the host country, protecting the fundamental rights and interests in the investee countries on the basis of international law, securing profit transfers, determining the conditions of possible expropriation by the host state and resorting to international arbitration in case of dispute" are reciprocally set out. [21]

Some of the provisions in the AMPPI that provide protection to investors are as follows: Pursuant to the nationalization, expropriation and compensation article, in cases of direct or indirect expropriation and interventions resulting in expropriation by the host state, the investor is protected against the damages caused by these interventions and has the guarantee that these damages will be effectively and adequately compensated and paid to him. In arbitration proceedings based on this clause, states are condemned to pay substantial damages unless they prove the existence of an absolute public interest. [22]

The full protection and security clause obliges the host state to protect the foreign investment from adverse treatment by itself, its institutions or third parties. Under this provision, legislative and administrative changes may constitute a violation of the principle of full protection and security.

Pursuant to the most favored nation treatment clause, the two contracting states undertake not to provide each other's investors or investments with less privileged and favorable treatment than that accorded to investors or investments of a third country that is not a party to the treaty. Accordingly, both states parties to the treaty will be obliged to grant to each other the same rights that they grant to the other states parties to other AMPPI that they have concluded, and investments and investors of the other state will be able to benefit from the most comprehensive rights granted to any country. Therefore, in the event of a dispute, not only the agreement concluded by the parties, but also other AMPPIs will be taken into account.

Under the national treatment clause, states parties to the treaty guarantee that they will not grant less favorable treatment to an investor of the state party to the treaty than they grant to their own investors. In all their regulations and practices, states shall treat all investments equally, without any distinction between domestic and foreign investments, so that the foreign investor is in a position to compete with the host country's own investors.

The arbitration clause allows for disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty to be resolved through international arbitration. This allows investors to resort to international arbitration without being subject to the courts of the host country.

Under the AMPPI, persons or companies that invest in AT1 bonds and hold AT1 bonds that are not Swiss may also be considered as foreign investors. Accordingly, the bailout operation carried out by the Swiss public authorities for the acquisition of Credit Suisse, and the devaluation of AT1 bonds in this process, may be subject to investment arbitration and international arbitration may be initiated against the Swiss state with claims for payment of the value of the investment, compensation for damages, etc. in accordance with the relevant articles of bilateral investment treaties, particularly by referring to the expropriation article.

Resorting to international arbitration instead of national courts for the resolution of this dispute has some advantages for the investor. First of all, in arbitration, the dispute is resolved by arbitrators appointed by the parties, who are experts in finance and banking and have experience in similar disputes.

Secondly, if the dispute is heard before the courts of the respondent state, there is always a risk that a decision will be rendered in favor of the state and against the foreign investor. It can be argued that this risk is reduced when the dispute is resolved by an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal with international members. Thirdly, arbitration offers a wider range of opportunities to the applicant compared to national courts, both in terms of the procedure and the means of proof available to the investor.

Fourthly, arbitral proceedings are shorter than proceedings before national courts.

Considering that even the European Union central and supervisory authorities in the member states have openly criticized the Credit Suisse operation and the write-off of AT1 bonds carried out by the Swiss public authorities on the grounds that, contrary to the hierarchy, the damage was primarily imposed on the AT1 bondholders [23], it would be useful for AT1 bondholders to consider the option of resorting to international investment arbitration against the Swiss state.

Att. Erse Kahraman


References:

1.https://www.haberturk.com/167-yillik-finans-devi-eriyor-credit-suisse-de-panik-3573864-ekonomi

2.https://www.reuters.com/legal/credit-suisse-is-sued-by-us-shareholders-over-finances-controls-2023-03-16/, https://www.dunya.com/finans/haberler/panik-buyuyor-credit-suissee-54-milyar-dolarlik-destek-haberi-688482

3.https://www.ubs.com/global/en/media/display-page-ndp/en-20230319-tree.html

4.https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2023/03/20230319-mm-cs-ubs/

5.https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/credit-suisse-bondholders-seek-legal-advice-at1-wipe-out-2023-03-23/https://www.dunya.com/dunya/credit-suisse-at1-tahvil-sahipleri-kayiplari-icin-olasi-yasal-yollari-degerlendiriyor-haberi-689020

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